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Abstract 
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INTRODUCTION1 
 
The magnitude of the welfare caseload has been a subject of increasing concern to 
voters and policy-makers. When it comes to public policy discussions of welfare 
programs, there is no doubt that this issue is a major topic. Interest in the analysis of the 
determining factors of the changes in the number of recipients has heightened recently, 
fed by concerns about the increasing costs due to what has been called the Great 
Recession. Previous work has provided evidence that unemployment and policy 
changes play a key role in caseloads changes. Researchers have consistently 
documented that policy designs have a substantial impact on the number of recipients 
and macroeconomy may reinforce and support the direction of legislative changes. An 
intensive literature has examined the relative importance of the different factors in 
explaining caseload changes (CEA, 1997; Figlio and Ziliak, 1999; Moffitt, 1999a; 
MaCurdy, et al., 2000; Blank, 2001; Wallace and Blank, 1999; Ziliak et al., 2000; 
Grogger et al., 2003; Grogger, 2004; Page et al., 2004; Haider et al., 2004; Ayala and 
Pérez, 2005; Looney, 2005; Danielson and Klerman, 2008). Most of this research 
concludes that lower unemployment rates are important determinants of the caseloads 
declines but changes in welfare programs and other policies are also relevant.  
 
Governments can soften the impact of the business cycles on welfare caseloads. Limited 
financial incentives that allow workers to keep less of their earnings while retaining 
benefits, lower benefit levels, compulsory work-related activities, time limits, or 
sanctions in case of non-compliance are some examples among a variety of options to 
reduce caseloads. There is, on one hand, a sizable body of research on the specific 
effects of each option on the aggregate welfare caseloads (Danielson and Klerman, 
2008; Chaudary and Gathmann, 2009). Beyond the specific policies there is even 
evidence of the strong influence of the implementation of policy on caseloads (Mead, 
2001; Loprest, 2012). On the other hand, public choice theory provides a 
comprehensive and consistent explanation of the possible effects of each of those 
options on the possible patterns of caseloads expansion and contraction. As shown by 
Moffitt (1999b), voters might react negatively to increases in welfare expenditures by 
seeking retrenchments in the system to limit the growth of caseloads. Lower levels of 
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benefits or stricter requirements to reduce take-up rates would become endogenous 
variables that policy-makers might use to that end.   
 
The likelihood of governments limiting the responsiveness of welfare caseloads to 
macroeconomic conditions is especially high when the economy grows slowly and 
unemployment rates increase steadily. Financial constraints might foster the 
introduction of more restrictive conditions in the abovementioned parameters of the 
programs. There is a variety of possibilities since the political costs the government 
would face differ among the different options. These costs are clearly higher when 
benefit levels are lowered than when governments decide to reduce take-up rates.  
 
Beginning in 2007, in many OECD countries economy underwent the deepest recession 
since the Great Depression. It stands to reason that a growing demand of benefits should 
have driven welfare caseloads to considerably higher levels than those registered before 
the economic downturn began. Recent evidence for the US shows, however, that 
welfare caseloads remained relatively flat (Zedlewski, 2008; Loprest, 2012). Bitler and 
Hoynes (2010) showed that since 2000 the trend in welfare caseloads bears little 
relationship to the national business cycle. The reason why this happens is that the 
welfare reform introduced in the mid-nineties gave rise to a decrease in the cyclicality 
of cash welfare. The available evidence suggests that the lack of increase in the post–
welfare reform recession is explained almost completely by declines in take-up rather 
than declines in eligibility (Zedlewski, 2008; Purtell and Gershoff, 2012). 
 
Governments therefore might use take-up rates in periods of economic downturns to 
avoid a dramatic growth of caseloads. This evidence raises important questions about 
the forces that shape government policy when the economy grows slowly. Depending 
on the political costs and the level of unemployment, governments might decide to 
modify some key programs’ parameters –benefit levels– but using others –the 
proportion of claimants that enter in the program– to prevent the increase in the number 
of welfare recipients. Ignoring the existence of these relationships can result in 
unreliable estimates of the determinants of welfare caseloads. 
 
This paper is motivated by this concern and takes as its starting point both the intensive 
literature on the determinants of welfare caseloads and some of the fundamentals of 
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public choice theory applied to the design of welfare programs. In this article, we aim to 
narrow the gap in the literature waiving together these two strands. The paper is based 
on data of the minimum income program of Catalonia’s Government. This is an 
interesting case of welfare design in a framework of economic recession. Spain is one of 
the countries where unemployment has grown the most during the great recession. 
Regarding the institutional design of the system, a relevant fact is that each regional 
government in Spain must finance the program with its own resources. There is no extra 
funding from the central government in case of economic downturns and in absence of 
changes in the design of the program increasing caseloads will give rise to noticeable 
growth of public expenditure. In Catalonia, while some of the implemented changes 
have tended to promote greater coverage among the potential claimants the government 
has also increased the proportion of rejected applications.  
 
We use long time-series data to find that unemployment has strong and significant 
lagged effects on the caseload. Second, our results provide some insights for 
understanding the nature of endogenous government policy in the design of these 
programs in periods of economic downturn. The generosity of the program –average 
size of benefits– was clearly predictive of receipt of benefit even in a context of high 
and growing unemployment rates. We also found, however, a fairly strong correlation 
between unemployment growth and the proportion of rejected applications. This later 
parameter might have been the chosen tool for avoiding an unsustainable increase of the 
caseloads. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The following section reviews some of the 
pathways through which macroeconomic conditions may affect welfare caseloads in 
alternative frameworks of public choice decisions. Section two introduces the program 
and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section three presents the empirical 
strategy. Results are discussed in the fourth section. The paper ends with a brief list of 
conclusions. 
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1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In the most basic approach, welfare caseloads can be considered a simple function of 
eligible households for the program and the corresponding take-up rate. Given that the 
decision of entering the program will be determined by household decisions and the 
utility they derive from receiving benefits, the main alternatives of governments to 
control the caseload will be reducing the level of benefits or increasing the proportion of 
rejections.  
 
Under the assumption of constant take-up rates, welfare caseloads are a function of a 
bundle of measures representing macroeconomic conditions and the parameters of the 
program. Numerous studies have addressed the relative importance of each one of these 
factors in explaining variations in the caseloads. The most common result is the key role 
unemployment and macroeconomic conditions have on the number of recipients. 
However, there is recent evidence showing that caseloads seem less responsive to 
unemployment changes than they were some years ago. By interacting unemployment 
rates and measures of welfare reform Bitler and Hoynes (2010) found that the 
substantial changes implemented in welfare programs in the US during the nineties 
caused a decrease in the cyclicality of cash welfare.   
 
This fact opens the door to a deeper understanding of the factors affecting the design of 
the programs that might cause a lower sensitivity of the number of recipients to 
unemployment changes. As shown by Zedlewski (2008), the available evidence 
suggests that the lack of increase in caseloads in the post–welfare reform recession was 
explained almost completely by declines in take-up rather than declines in eligibility. 
Declining real benefits, work requirements, sanctions for failure to meet particular rules, 
time limits, and state strategies that divert families from enrolling all played a part. 
More recent data from Loprest (2012) shows that the national caseload declined by 50 
percent between 1997 and 2011, but specific state caseload reductions ranged from 25 
to 80 percent. Factors such as the economy and the earned income tax credit played a 
key role in the caseload decline, but welfare policy had a substantial impact. The 
caseload decline could be attributed both to more families leaving the program and to 
fewer eligible families participating.  
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A key question therefore is which the political strategies that may produce a 
countervailing effect on caseloads when unemployment grows are. In the US case, 
Danielson and Klerman (2008) used difference-in-difference models of the determinants 
of the aggregate welfare caseload to find that while they could attribute about a quarter 
of the caseload decline to time limits and sanctions and about a fifth to the economy a 
residual policy bundle explained a third of the changes. After many years of research, 
we still have relatively little insight into which are the political channels through which 
governments develop endogenous strategies to maintain the number of welfare 
recipients around a sustainable level of expenditure. 
 
Until relatively recently economic theory was silent on how policy-makers 
simultaneously modify some parameters of the program in different directions to 
prevent high pressures on government's fiscal situation. The major economic rationale 
for these endogenous strategies revolves around assertions of public choice theory. 
Governments have the ability to choose both the extent of welfare eligibility as the 
intensity of benefits provided through the programs. Moffitt (1999) provided a 
comprehensive explanation of the reasons for particular patterns of expansion or 
contraction in welfare expenditure within a public-choice framework. While primacy 
was assigned to voters and their preferences, the model works well also to identify the 
incentives of government to consider the recipiency rate as a policy goal.  
 
Consider a conventional function of voter (V) preferences with a utility function like 
 
U=f(CV,CP)     (1) 
 
where CV is the consumption of the voter and CP is the consumption of the poor, f1>0, 
f2≥0. Two constraints can be added: 
 
CP = YP + B      (2) 
CV = YV - T      (3) 
 
being YP and YV the non-transfer income and before-tax income of the poor and non-
poor, respectively; B the benefit level per welfare recipient; and T the tax payment per 
person to finance the welfare benefits. If this takes a per capita form:  
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T = BNW / Nnp = BR      (4) 
 
where Nw is the number of units receiving welfare benefits and P is the size of the non-
poor population. This makes R the per capita recipiency rate –over the entire non-poor 
population– and it can be considered a general measure of the caseload size. 
Government should decide the level of B that maximizes utility. The marginal condition 
for optimal B is: 
 
(,)
	(,)
=      (5) 
 
This result implies that the price of increasing benefits is the recipiency rate. As posed 
by Moffit (1999), a central question in terms of our analysis is that R and B are 
endogenous. R is positively affected by benefits and negatively affected by the potential 
income of eligible units: 
 
R = f(B,YP)      (6) 
 
Considering the recipiency function an additional constraint, optimal benefits should 
meet the condition: 
 
(,)
	(,)
= (1 + η)     (7) 
 
where R(1+η) is the elasticity of the recipiency rate with regard to the benefit. 
Therefore, the only exogenous variable determining the caseload is YP.  It seems 
reasonable that contractionary policies will receive support with declining real incomes 
and employment rates. The central issue, however, is that governments can change the 
level of benefits or the recipiency rate to control changes in welfare expenditure. 
 
Earlier evidence summarized by Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) showed that estimated price 
effects range from negative and elastic results to positive results, with the majority of 
studies reporting small and negative results. Income estimates also range from strongly 
negative to strongly positive. Their own results reexamining the specification 
7 
 
assumptions used in these analyses and treating the price variable as exogenous placed 
the range of price elasticities between -0.14 and 0.02. For income, the overlapping 
confidence bounds are wider, with the estimated elasticity ranging from 0.11 to 0.82. 
These results seem to indicate that welfare generosity might be much less sensitive to 
economic changes than the usual assumptions. 
 
Baicker (2005) proposed a more general model than that of the previous analysis. 
Governments may determine eligibility standards, including asset tests and other 
requirements. The number of recipients should thus be a function of both eligibility 
parameter choices and the preferences and characteristics of the potential recipient pool. 
In her model, the first order condition is that the marginal rate of substitution between 
expanding eligibility and increasing benefits is just equal to the marginal cost of adding 
one recipient over the marginal cost of adding one dollar to the benefit amount.  
 
These fundamentals introduce a possible relationship between the level of benefits and 
the recipiency rate and gives place to the analysis of different government strategies for 
preventing an unsustainable growth of the caseload. Shifts in the recipiency function are 
possible including among them possible actions focused on reducing the number of 
households entering into the program.  
 
The extent to which governments make use of more restrictive strategies will depend on 
different issues. There might be institutional factors acting as potential incentives to 
reduce the number of recipients. In the US, for instance, before the welfare reform was 
enacted a matching financing formula protected states from the full economic costs of 
serving more families when the economy weakened, since the federal government 
shared the costs of increased caseloads with the states. The new system operates very 
differently because states generally do not get more federal funding when caseloads 
increase in hard economic times. Since financing is a block grant, decisions on whether 
or how to reallocate funds to address greater economic hardship rest solely with the 
state. As stated by Pavetti et al. (2011), there are some features of the new system that 
create a disincentive to serve more families during periods of greater need: i) the block 
grant structure means that if a state uses more funding for cash assistance, it will have 
less for other measures included in the welfare-funded programs; ii) since the primary 
performance measure of the welfare program is the work participation rate, the system 
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rewards states for reducing their welfare caseloads, even if the economy is weak; iii) 
when the economy weakens and fewer jobs are available, it becomes more difficult for 
states to meet their prescribed work participation rates unless they keep caseloads down.  
 
The incentives to reduce caseloads will depend therefore on the intensity of potential 
unemployment shocks and the specific institutional details of the program. It might be 
the case that there could be an expenditure threshold from which the government should 
try to reduce the caseloads through a higher proportion of rejections. It will depend on 
the possible trade-off between lower benefit levels or lower recipiency rates if 
unemployment reaches a sizable level. Estimates for the US show that a 10 percent 
increase in the cost of benefits causes a 3.8 percent decrease in benefit amounts, while a 
10 percent increase in the cost of recipients causes a 2.8 percent decrease in the number 
of recipients (Baicker, 2005).  
 
2. THE PIRMI PROGRAM AND ITS CONTEXT 
  
The data used in this study are the administrative records of the Catalonian Minimum 
Income Program (PIRMI). Like other regional programs in Spain, the PIRMI Program 
was designed at the beginning of the nineties following the pattern of the French 
Revenue Minimum d’Insertion. In Southern European countries new welfare schemes 
were created some years before reforms were implemented in other OECD countries. 
By the later 1980s France and other countries had put into practice a new social tool 
trying to reconcile two different objectives: providing a basic level of economic 
protection and developing measures to improve social and labor participation of low-
income households.  
In the PIRMI program different activities were established aimed at achieving these two 
goals. First, there is a cash benefit which is set taking into account the household size. 
The monthly level of benefits for single-person households were 414 euros in 2010. 
Additional adjustments for each child or other adults are less than 100 euros. Second, 
the program comprises a variety of measures developed both to guarantee the basic 
preconditions of social participation and to improve recipients’ employment 
opportunities.  
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Potential claimants can apply for benefits only if they have used up entitlement to other 
income maintenance programs. Like other European systems, the main difference from 
U.S. programs is that welfare covers all households. PIRMI access is not only allowed 
to female lone-parent households, but also to couples without children, single 
individuals or male-headed families. Eligibility conditions are restricted to an upper age 
limit (65 years of age, at which age claimants can benefit from the national non-
contributory pension scheme) and a lower age limit (25 years of age, except for 
claimants with dependent children). Along with these, in order to prevent the formation 
of fictitious family units solely aimed at receiving the benefit, households must have 
been formed for a defined period before claiming that benefit. Another legal 
requirement is that of being officially registered in Catalonia as a resident. This 
requirement is compatible with people of other nationalities claiming the benefit. 
Welfare policies in Spain are completely decentralised. The lack of initiative by the 
central government in the late 1980s encouraged regional governments to begin 
establishing their own welfare programs. The result of this development was a mosaic 
of highly varied schemes, with a striking disparity of regulations and benefit levels 
across the different regions. As a result, each regional government sets the level of 
benefits and any other aspect of the programs’ design with total autonomy. In this sense, 
changes in welfare caseloads will raise needs for additional funding that can only come 
from the regions own resources.  
[FIGURE 1] 
Monitoring the flow of entries into and exits from the program is possible because of a 
wide base of administrative records. Our sample period –monthly data– runs from 1998 
to the first quarter of 2011. This period is affected by the marked change in the business 
cycle that took place in 2007. Figure 1 shows how the total number of recipients has 
changed over the last and a half decade. The number of households receiving benefits 
remained roughly constant between the last third of the 1990s and the first years of the 
next decade. The average number of recipients was around 10,000. The number of 
recipients began to slightly increase in the next years through 2006 pushing that number 
above 12,000 households. In 2007 economy underwent the deepest recession since the 
seventies. As a result, the number of recipients rose to an historical high of nearly 
30,000 households at the moment of data gathering (May 2011). 
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[FIGURE 2] 
There might be different reasons why caseloads increased. A natural focus is what has 
happened in the labor market. The number of employees paying Social Security 
contributions fall from an historical high of nearly 3.5 million in 2007 to 3 million in 
2011 (Figure 2). Before the economic crisis broke out there had been a strong increase 
in these numbers in clear contrast with the much more stable caseloads trend. Changes 
in unemployment have been more drastic with an unprecedented growth in the number 
of individuals registered as unemployed. Registered unemployment tripled in three 
years moving from 125,000 unemployed in 2007 to more than 600,000 four years later. 
The trend is very similar to the one observed for the caseloads. During the second half 
of the nineties unemployment declined noticeably, followed by a period of stability 
during the next seven years, but it began to creep up again in 2007, and continued 
upward at rather increasing pace. 
 
These administrative data only provide a partial picture of the changes in 
macroeconomic conditions and unemployment. The Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
records quarterly data on unemployment at territorial level. The unemployed as a 
percent of the labor force is a standard measure for macroeconomic conditions in the 
analysis of welfare caseloads. This is not however the most direct measure of how 
changes in the labor market might affect the demand of welfare. Recent evidence for the 
Spanish economy shows that the intra-household distribution of unemployment can be 
more relevant than aggregate unemployment in order to explain poverty changes (Ayala 
et al., 2011). The proportion of workless households or the unemployment rate of 
households heads can be key factors to explain the impact of recessions on poverty.   
 
[FIGURE 3] 
Figure 3 illustrates the changes in alternative rates in Catalonia taking into account this 
intra-household distribution of unemployment. The unemployment rate rose from a 
level slightly higher than a 6 percent in 2007 to an historical high of nearly a 20 percent 
three years later. The rate for households heads doubled from 2007 to 2010 while the 
proportion of households where all active members are unemployed rose from its lowest 
value –1.5 percent in 2005– to more than a six percent. The lack of employment has 
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introduced, inexorably, a remarkable pressure on the demand for benefits. This can be 
corroborated looking at data on the proportion of ‘disconnected’ households or 
households who do not earn any income from labor and neither benefit from any Social 
Security transfers (i.e. pensions or other benefits) nor from unemployment insurance or 
assistance payments. The EPA provides quarterly information on this variable that can 
serve as a proxy for the demand of welfare benefits. With the natural caveats resulting 
from the limited sample size of the survey, it seems that this potential demand registered 
an extraordinary increase through the recession period (Figure 4). The rate rose from a 
proportion of affected households of 1.5 percent in 2007 to a 3 percent three years later.  
 
[FIGURE 4] 
Therefore, macroeconomic conditions have changed significantly over the last decade 
and a half. The deep recession that began in 2007 gave rise to an unparalleled growth of 
situations preluding considerably higher levels of demand for PIRMI benefits. These 
changes could introduce a strong pressure on the designers of the program as the 
increasing number of eligible households could be translated into a rapid growth in 
caseloads. In keeping with the theoretical background summarized in previous section, 
the government could have modified some of the parameters of the program to maintain 
the caseloads around a predefined threshold. 
 
[FIGURE 5] 
An indirect approach for testing the possible effect of unemployment changes in the 
number of recipients is looking differently at entry and exit flows in the program. Figure 
5 shows how these monthly flows have changed over a time span of more than thirteen 
years. Both flows registered similar trends before the recession began. When the 
economic expansion came to a halt, entries grew at a faster pace but exits did not 
decline. This last fact contrasts with the standard assumption of lower exits from 
welfare programs in periods of declining employment opportunities. As stated above, it 
could also be an indirect proof of governmental reaction to prevent unsustainable 
growth of welfare caseloads. In addition to promoting exits, as mentioned before, 
governments can also affect the caseloads trough changes in benefits and the proportion 
of rejected applications. Average benefits, however, must not always be interpreted as 
policy decisions. In addition to legal changes mirroring government’s preferences these 
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amounts also represent changes in the economic needs of households entering into the 
programs. While in periods of lower unemployment rates households applying for 
benefits might be unable to find a job –having therefore very limited economic 
resources– an opposite situation might be the case in economic downturns. In this later 
context, it is possible a more varied mix of recipients including households who 
transitorily enter into the program to sum more resources to an unexpected low income. 
 
[FIGURE 6] 
Figure 6 plots the path followed by both variables. The data show that until 2002 
average benefits grew slowly as a result of annual price indexation. From that year and 
up to 2007 there were few changes in the level of benefits. In 2007, however, benefits 
rose again with no remarkable changes in the years after. The proportion of rejected 
applications shows a much more erratic behavior. Despite this volatility, it is possible to 
appreciate a declining trend at the beginning of our sample period, a somewhat upward 
profile from then and up to the beginning of the economic crisis, and a sizable growth in 
this last period. As mentioned above, this last result might be associated with an 
endogenous process of decision-making. To prevent an unsustainable growth in the 
number of recipients the government might have chosen to increase rejections instead of 
reducing benefits.    
 
Other institutional issues relevant to understand possible changes in caseloads are a set 
of partial reforms that were enacted during our sample period. While some reforms have 
promoted greater coverage among the poor others have made the program more 
restrictive.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Over the past two decades, a variety of methods have been developed for modeling the 
dynamics of welfare caseloads. While most of the 1990s studies used panel data or 
time-series models more recent approaches have suggested alternative techniques. 
Grogger (2007), for instance, used Markov chains exploiting the inertia of caseloads to 
base forecasts of the future caseloads on current exits and entries. Zolotoy and Sherman 
(2009) implemented a two-step latent factor approach to model welfare caseloads.  
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Since we have data for one program and a long time-span –monthly data that run from 
January 1998 to the first quarter of 2011– estimation was by standard time-series 
analysis since more sophisticated techniques did not seem to be called for. The basic 
statistical equation that we estimate is: 
 
Ct= α1+ α2Ut + α3Bt + α4Rt + α5Π+ εt   (8) 
 
where Ct is the number of registered caseloads at the monthly level (the ratio of 
recipients to the population over 25 years of age), Ut is the unemployment rate, Bt is the 
average benefit –reflecting the program’s generosity–, Rt is the proportion of rejected 
applications –reflecting the program’s restrictiveness– and Π
  
are dummies capturing the 
effects of specific reforms. The variables have been considered in logarithms to avoid 
the problem of a lack of stationarity in the variance. In addition, this allows the 
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. This approach enables to control the effects 
of macroeconomic conditions –unemployment rate– and the effects of the different 
strategies the government might undertake.
 
 
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis it is necessary to study the order of 
integration of all the variables considered –including entries (ENt) and exits (Ext)– by 
performing unit roots tests for the full sample. The null hypothesis of non-stationary 
cannot be rejected with several formal stationarity tests. According to the results of the 
augmented Dickey–Fuller unit root test, as well as of the Phillips–Perron test, most of 
the variables included in equation (8) are I(1) and, therefore, non-stationary at levels but 
stationary at their first difference (Table 1). Only the proportion of rejected applications 
and the flow of exits seem to be I(0).  
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
Once the properties of the series have been confirmed it is necessary to specify an 
adequate form for the relationship introduced in (8). The approach chosen for this paper 
is an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model. We include as regressors lagged 
values of the caseloads and current and lagged valu
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As stated by Grogger (2007) today’s caseload depends in part on yesterday’s caseload 
and the current levels of recipients exhibit inertia. Some authors have challenged, 
however, the introduction of lagged values of economic conditions in the specification 
of caseloads models. McKinnish (2005), for instance, suggests that estimates on lagged 
unemployment rates may merely reflect the presence of omitted variable or 
measurement error bias. Nevertheless, another large literature has found as necessary 
the lags of the measures of the economy to capture the dynamics of caseload change 
(Bartik and Eberts, 1999; Figlio and Ziliak, 1999; Wallace and Blank, 1999; Ziliak et 
al., 2000; Mueser et al., 2000; Blank, 2001; Haider et al., 2001; Grogger, 2007; 
Danielson and Klerman, 2008; and Bitler and Hoynes, 2010). An intensive literature has 
also examined the inertia component in the persistence of unemployment. Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) explained, for instance, the high dependence of current 
unemployment on past unemployment. They argued that physical capital, human 
capital, and insider-outsider theories are not enough to explain why shocks that cause 
unemployment upturns in a single period might have long-term effects. They concluded 
that hysteresis –unemployment inertia– is a feature of the business cycle rather than a 
consequence of a particular structure of the labor market. Such effects continue being an 
important source of persistence of European unemployment rates. 
 
Most single-equation econometric models can be thought of as special cases of the ADL 
model. Alternative specifications of this model can be obtained by restricting various 
parameters (leading indicator, growth rate model, partial adjustment, common factor 
model, equilibrium correction mechanisms or dead-start model).2 In this paper, our 
starting point is a basic ADL specified considering restrictions on a general error 
correction model (ECM). The reason of considering the later model is that welfare 
caseloads and unemployment time series can move together in a long-run equilibrium 
relationship. This possible long-run relationship between Ct and Ut can be anticipated 
using cointegration techniques. This is a central issue in this type of analysis. When the 
series are cointegrated by a common factor –cointegrating vector– it is not possible to 
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 See Hendry (1995) and Banerjee et al. (1993). 
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use a standard VAR-approach. Then, we have to account for this relationship and use an 
error-correction model to get consistent results.  
 
A necessary condition to conduct cointegration tests is that the variables under study 
must be integrated of the same order. As stated before, the main variables are integrated 
of order 1 and therefore the appropriate cointegration tests can be determined. As usual 
in VAR models, the Akaike Information Criteria and the Schwarz Criteria have been 
used to define the optimal lag structure3. We test the presence of a cointegration 
relationship between the welfare caseloads and unemployment calculating the trace and 
maximum eigenvalue statistics (Johansen, 1995).  
 
If the long run condition between caseloads and unemployment is confirmed, the 
equilibrium relationship can be transformed into a new equation through an Error 
Correction Mechanism (ECM). The ECM associates changes in one of the series (or 
both) to past equilibrium error, as well as to past changes in both. The long-run 
relationship is expressed as: 
 
Ct = ϕUt-1 + ut     (10) 
 
The error correction equations with one lag can be estimated as: 
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,11,11,1
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−−−
−−−
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     (12) 
where 
                                                          
3
 The AIC and SC Criteria are commonly used to determine lag lengths in VAR models. 
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Zt = Ct-1 - ϕUt-1     (13) 
 
is the cointegration relationship and β
C
 and β
U
  are the speeds of adjustment to long run 
equilibrium of welfare caseloads
 
and the unemployment rate.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
 a) Determinants of Welfare Caseloads 
 
As stated above, we estimate a dynamic model that includes lagged terms of the 
caseloads among the explanatory variables. All the specifications include this dependent 
variable with one and two period lags among the determinants. Although the 
coefficients of the dynamic models are smaller than those of static models, the 
coefficients for the effects of unemployment and the program’s parameters appear with 
the expected signs (Table 2). Several points are worth mentioning. Of all our findings, 
one unequivocal message is that economy matters. As expected, unemployment rates 
have sizable and significant effects on the program’s caseloads. The higher 
unemployment rate is, the higher welfare caseloads are. A one-point rise in the 
unemployment rate increases caseloads about a 5 per cent.  
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
It seems, however, that the lagged effects of economic conditions on PIRMI 
participation are important. Columns (5)-(10) of Table 2 give general support to the 
notion that the optimal forecasting horizon for the model involves lagged effects of the 
economy. The parameter estimates for the lagged unemployment rates are consistent 
with the previous statement that including lags of the measures of the economy are 
needed to capture the dynamics of caseload change. The effects of changes in 
unemployment on caseloads are more modest when the rates are included in their 
current values. We also consider a moving average of unemployment (USt) using 2 
lagged terms, 3 forward terms, and the current observation in the filter (uniformly 
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weighted) (Column 11).  The estimated coefficient for this variable does not drastically 
change the picture presented in columns (3) and (4). 
 
Among all the variables included in the specification –with the exception of the lagged 
caseloads–, the most important turns out to be the generosity of the program. We find 
that, to a high degree of statistical confidence, the estimated effects of the impact of 
changing the benefit levels are large. The estimated elasticities are higher than those of 
the unemployment rate (5.6 percent). In keeping with the public choice fundamentals 
previously reviewed, the ability of the government to choose the intensity of benefits 
can have substantial effects on welfare caseloads. The sizable coefficients are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the higher the benefits are, the greater the number of 
households receiving benefits is.  
 
Compared to the estimated effects for unemployment and the average level of benefits, 
the coefficients for the variable reflecting the program’s restrictiveness –proportion of 
rejected applications– are relative small. Nevertheless, the most striking result is the 
negative sign found for this variable. It seems that there is a kind of reverse causality 
suggesting that lowering the recipiency rate might have been chosen as a strategy to 
prevent increases in the program’s expenditure. As we will see below, this kind of 
endogeneity might be related to changes in the unemployment rate. Decisions to impose 
more restrictions to reduce the flow of entries might be a response to unemployment 
shocks. 
 
In general terms, the estimates are quite robust to a number of minor changes in the 
initial specification. In addition to the inclusion of the two previous parameters 
reflecting welfare designs our models also include controls for specific reforms. In 
general terms, these controls do not change the picture presented in the first columns of 
Table 2. The 2006 reform affected negatively to the caseloads (around one point) while 
the 2008 reform seems to have produced a positive influence (coefficients between 0.09 
and 1.5). The first one of these reforms introduced some incentives to promote higher 
levels of labor participation among the recipients. The second one moderated some of 
the strictest rules of the previous reform including a reduction in the number of working 
hours required to access to complementary benefits.  
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 b) Determinants of the flows of exit and entry in the program 
 
An alternative approach to analyze the determinants of changes in the caseloads is to 
estimate specific models for the flows of entries and exits. As stated by Grogger (2007), 
in the simplest terms, today’s caseload depends on yesterday’s caseload plus entries and 
exits. The observed increase in the caseload could have resulted from an increase in 
entries, a decrease in exits, or some combination of the two. The preliminary results 
shown in section showed, however, that when the recession began entries grew at a 
faster pace but exits did not decline. As abovementioned, this uncharacteristic behavior 
is not in keeping with the standard assumptions of welfare participation and could 
thereby hide a governmental reaction to moderate the growth of welfare caseloads. 
According to standard theory the components of the exit and entry functions should be 
similar but the expected signs should differ. Under a linear specification of the 
relationship between unemployment and both flows, it should be expected that increases 
in unemployment reduce exits and boost entries with a similar effect for the generosity 
of the program. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Our estimates yield, however, dissimilar results for each flow. Concerning entries, all 
the specifications included in Table 3 show a strong and significant effect of 
macroeconomic conditions. Again, it is necessary to include a structure of lags for better 
capturing the dynamic effect of unemployment on entries. A positive effect on entries is 
also found for the average level of benefits. The generosity of the program has led to 
increased use of benefits. Rejections, however, present the expected negative effect in 
this case. 
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
The fit is rather worse for the exits model. An amazing result is the positive effect of the 
unemployment rate on the number of recipients leaving the program. In contrast to the 
natural assumption that lower employment opportunities should reduce the probability 
of leaving the program there seems to be an opposite influence of macroeconomic 
conditions on exits. On the other side, the estimates for the two parameters reflecting 
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generosity and restrictiveness are imprecise. It appears that these factors do not play a 
key role as determinants of exits from the program.  
 
It seems therefore that there could be omitted variables that should be considered for an 
adequate modeling of the flow of exits. A key factor might be that the government 
could have applied stricter rules on the households staying in the program. As 
Danielson and Klerman (2008) found for the U.S., a residual policy bundle could 
explain the main changes in the number of exits. More control of compulsory work-
related activities or harder sanctions in case of non-compliance are some examples of 
actions leading to lower numbers of households staying in the program. The shifts in the 
recipiency function would come then from the increase in entries resulting from higher 
unemployment rates and higher benefit levels and the increase in exits derived from 
policy actions focused on increasing the number of households leaving the program.  
 
 c) The endogeneity of rejections 
 
Previous results suggest that the policy options under study –generosity and 
restrictiveness – do not have a clear countervailing effect on the number of caseloads. 
While the effect of the average levels of benefits on welfare caseloads is strong and 
positive, according to the estimated coefficients the proportion of rejected applications 
also might be pushing up the number of recipients. This contradictory result could be 
related to the previous discussion on the potential use of rejections as a policy strategy 
to reduce the number of caseloads. A plausible case can be made that those estimates 
could be hiding the relationship between unemployment and rejections. In times of 
severe recession governments might choose between an increase in the proportion of 
rejected applications, a decrease in the level of benefits, or some combination of the 
two. The political costs of reducing the program’s generosity may be higher, at least in 
the short-term, than those of increasing rejections of welfare applications.  
 
[TABLE 5] 
 
Table 5 gives general support to the notion that the proportion of rejected applications 
might be linked to changes in the labor market over the economic cycle. The 
coefficients for unemployment appear in line with the previous hypothesis. The higher 
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unemployment rate is, the higher rejections are. Coefficient estimates on lagged 
unemployment rates also reveal that there is a delay in the effect of changes in 
macroeconomic conditions on policy decisions. These results at least suggest that 
unemployment might be important to understand how the program’s designers try to 
avoid large increases of the caseloads through a higher proportion of rejected 
applications. 
 
A second relevant question is the extent to which there is a possible trade-off between 
generosity and restrictiveness in the PIRMI program. As stated before, both strategies 
could take place simultaneously. Despite the estimates seem sensitive to the different 
specifications, the most important factual finding is that results provide a rough 
indication of statistical association between changes in the average level of benefits and 
the proportion of rejected applications. In the most basic specification (Column 1 of 
Table 5), the generosity of the program seems to have a sizeable and significant effect 
on its restrictiveness. Therefore, the changes in one of the parameters of the program 
might in some sense matter more on the decisions on new recipients than changes in the 
unemployment rate. Rejections would be the response to increases in the average level 
of benefits to partially offsetting the effects on the caseloads numbers. This inference, 
however, is subject to some caveats as these effects seem dwarfed when controls for 
specific reforms and lagged unemployment rates are considered. 
 
 d) Cointegration and ECM models 
 
A last empirical issue has to do with the possibility of testing whether the relationships 
found also hold in the long run. We carried out different test finding that the results are 
free of spurious results in both the short and the long run. The usual statistics of 
Johansen (1995) tests –maximun eigenvalues and a trace statistics– confirm that there 
exist cointegration relationships.  Given that a cointegrating vector exists between the 
main variables of our estimates, we proceeded to estimate alternative error correction 
equations using data for the entire period.  
 
[TABLE 6] 
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Table 6 illustrates how welfare caseloads have a stable long run relationship with the 
unemployment rate. It holds in all the specifications considering from one to four lags. 
According to the estimated parameter in the first model for the caseloads equation (-
0.079) the adjustment in the long run of the number of caseloads to unemployment is 
confirmed. When the economy is working well (low unemployment rates) and the 
number of caseloads is low, they will increase. In periods of economic downturn (high 
unemployment rates) and higher numbers of caseloads, they will fall back to their 
equilibrium level . 
 
[TABLE 7] 
 
Table 7 presents estimates of alternative ECM models considering the other variables 
(Ct,Rt,Π2006,Π2008).  Results with these models also show that welfare caseloads have a 
stable long run relationship with the unemployment rate in most of the estimated 
models. The average number of caseloads adjusts to unemployment levels in the long 
run in all the specifications considering one-period lag. In the short run, changes in the 
unemployment rate also affect caseloads variations. The slope coefficient of -0.06 
implies that if the number of caseloads in the previous month was higher than what the 
long-equilibrium relationship predicts then there will be and adjustment to reduce this 
number. About  a 6.5 percent of the disequilibrium is corrected each month by changes 
in unemployment. Results of the ECM models also confirm the previous effects of the 
other covariates –generosity, restrictiveness and specific reforms.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Among the different issues that need to be addressed in the design of welfare programs 
one outstanding question is how to prevent an unsustainable growth of the caseloads in 
contexts of limited budgetary resources. According to standard economic theory 
unemployment upturns can cause a drastic increase in the number of eligible 
households. This natural effect might be reinforced of softened by the designers of the 
programs. Public choice theory has shown that different strategies might give rise to 
very different effects. Depending on the political costs and the extent of unemployment, 
governments might choose between an increase in the proportion of rejected 
applications, a decrease in the level of benefits, or some combination of the two. 
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In this paper we have estimated the simultaneous effects on caseloads of higher levels of 
generosity –changes in the average level of benefits– and higher doses of restrictiveness 
–a higher proportion of rejected applications– in a framework of increasing 
unemployment. Using data of the minimum income program of Catalonia’s 
Government and autoregressive distributed lag models we have tested the extent to 
which macroeconomic conditions might change welfare caseloads not only through 
increasing the proportion of eligible households but also affecting the key parameters of 
the program.  
 
As expected, economy matters. Changes in unemployment rates have sizable and 
significant effects on the program’s caseloads. Our estimates show that the impact of 
this variable is especially strong when some lags are taken into account. In any case, the 
most important effect on the caseloads seems to be that caused by the generosity of the 
program. The estimated elasticities are higher for the level of benefits than for the 
unemployment rate. The ability of the government, therefore, to choose the intensity of 
benefits can have substantial effects on welfare caseloads. This effect holds even when 
unemployment rates move from relatively low to much higher levels. 
 
The explicitness of this political strategy should not hide however that the apparent 
generosity of the program might be partially offset by other decisions. On the one hand, 
while entries in the program seem to be motivated by changes in unemployment or the 
average levels of benefits –in keeping with standard assumptions– our estimates have 
shown that the worsening of macroeconomic conditions has been associated with a 
higher number of exits instead of lowering the probabilities of leaving the program. 
Since the natural event should have been a decrease in exit rates, this is a possible 
indication of endogenous actions aimed at compensating the increasing number of 
caseloads. 
 
On the other hand, a striking result of our estimates is the positive effect on the 
caseloads found for the variable reflecting the program’s restrictiveness. This might also 
be a signal that the lowering of the proportion of accepted applications might be part of 
the strategy to prevent increases in the program’s expenditure. In fact, our estimates 
23 
 
have confirmed that decisions to impose more restrictions to reduce the flow of entries 
might have been used as a response to unemployment shocks.  
 
It can be said, in short, that the effects of endogenous government policy might be as 
important, or even more so, than the economy on welfare caseloads. It is necessary 
therefore to modeling the changes themselves in the level of benefits or in the 
proportion of rejected applications as a response to changes in macroeconomic 
conditions. The choice of one or other alternative will depend on both the own level of 
unemployment and the political costs of each option. 
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Figure 1. Changes in the number of recipients, 1998-2011 
 
 
Figure 2. Changes in the number of employees paying Social Security 
contributions and registered unemployment, 1996-2011 
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Figure 3. Quarterly alternative unemployment rates, 1998-2010 
 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of households without income from the labor market and 
Social Security benefits, 1998-2010 
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Figure 5. Flows of exit and entry in the PIRMI program 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Average benefits and proportion of rejected applications 
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Table 1. Unit root and stationarity tests 
 ADF PP 
τ  τµ τ τ Z(tα) Z(tα*) Z(t-α) 
Ct -1.23 3.59 0.11 -1.84* 3.10 1.01 
D.Ct -3.48*** -11.90*** -4.56*** -11.8*** -12.3*** -13.1*** 
Ut 0.12 -0.76 -1.40 0.06 -0.89 -1.26 
D.Ut -4.71*** -12.5*** -5.03*** -12.6*** -12.6*** -13.0*** 
Bt 2.40 -0.73 -2.62 2.41 -0.72 -2.81 
D.Bt -6.16*** -12.2*** -6.78*** -11.8*** -12.2*** -12.2*** 
Rt -0.56 -5.31*** -3.56** -0.60 -5.14*** -6.20*** 
D.Rt -8.72*** -17.3*** -8.79*** -20.1*** -20.0*** -20.2*** 
ENt -0.83 -2.98 -2.07 -0.84 -2.09 -3.78*** 
D. ENt -7.54*** -23.1*** -7.80*** -24.3*** -24.4*** -25.0*** 
EXt -0.96 -8.19*** -4.29*** -1.60 -8.26*** -8.65*** 
D.EXt -9.37*** -18.6*** -9.31*** -20.6*** -20.6*** -20.5*** 
 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
τ , τµ and τ τ correspond to the Augmented Dickey–Fuller statistics without a constant, with a constant, 
and with a constant and trend, respectively. 
Z(tα), Z(tα*) and Z(t-α)correspond to the Phillips-Perron statistics without a constant, with a constant, and 
with a constant and trend, respectively. 
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TABLE 2. DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE CASELOADS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ct-1 0.217*** 0.198*** 0.122 0.135* 0.107 0.074 0.080 0.134 0.160* 0.146* 0.133* 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.076) (0.079) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.077) 
Ct-2 0.388*** 0.401*** 0.336*** 0.316*** 0.274*** 0.276*** 0.242*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.279*** 0.310*** 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.079) (0.086) (0.080) (0.081) (0.074) 
Ut 0.486*** 0.538*** 0.353*** 0.329** 
(0.103) (0.105) (0.126) (0.126) 
Bt 0.562*** 0.636*** 0.529** 0.561** 0.761*** 0.796*** 0.796*** 0.557** 0.513** 0.587** 0.594*** 
(0.131) (0.135) (0.220) (0.221) (0.220) (0.232) (0.244) (0.264) (0.255) (0.259) (0.221) 
Rt -0.174** -0.165* 
(0.087) (0.090) 
Π
 2006 -0.089 -0.134* -0.147* -0.141* -0.145* -0.129 -0.104 -0.102 -0.143* 
(0.082) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.079) 
Π
 2008 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.350*** 0.373*** 0.443*** 0.575*** 0.546*** 0.556*** 0.409*** 
(0.136) (0.137) (0.132) (0.131) (0.129) (0.131) (0.128) (0.125) (0.137) 
Ut-1 0.507*** 
(0.127) 
Ut-2  0.517*** 
(0.137) 
Ut-3 0.481*** 
(0.144) 
Ut-6 0.212 
(0.141) 
Ut-9 0.234* 
(0.119) 
Ut-12 0.277** 
(0.113) 
USt 0.366*** 
(0.128) 
Constant -6.371*** -7.270*** -6.931*** -6.787*** -8.711*** -9.097*** -9.165*** -6.692*** -6.351*** -6.982*** -7.100*** 
(1.225 (1.295) (1.695) (1.707) (1.726) (1.865) (2.012) (2.153) (1.986) (1.98) (1.706) 
N 157 157 157 157 157 157 156 153 150 147 157 
R2 0.807 0.812 0.824 0.820 0.830 0.828 0.825 0.816 0.823 0.825 0.822 
Log likelihood 380.5 382.7 388.9 388.4 389.7 390.2 389.0 379.7 370.3 363.2 388.9 
F 5632 4601 3513 4101 4170 4192 4257 4143 4012 3985 4126 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3. DETERMINANTS OF ENTRIES  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ut 1.131*** 1.177*** 0.621*** 0.615*** 
(0.068) (0.074) (0.126) (0.122) 
Bt 1.178*** 1.238*** 0.951*** 0.967*** 1.143*** 1.197*** 1.212*** 1.134*** 1.079*** 1.114*** 0.989*** 
(0.117) (0.123) (0.223) (0.222) (0.212) (0.214) (0.212) (0.226) (0.235) (0.241) (0.221) 
Rt -0.172* -0.107 
(0.102) (0.096) 
Π
 2006 -0.239*** -0.265*** -0.253*** -0.241*** -0.232*** -0.240*** -0.232*** -0.219*** -0.275*** 
(0.084) (0.080) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080) (0.081) (0.083) (0.079) 
Π
 2008 0.728*** 0.717*** 0.567*** 0.557*** 0.581*** 0.793*** 0.873*** 0.901*** 0.692*** 
(0.129) (0.128) (0.124) (0.127) (0.123) (0.119) (0.108) (0.099) (0.128) 
Ut-1 0.775*** 
(0.118) 
Ut-2 0.776*** 
(0.122) 
Ut-3 0.757*** 
(0.118) 
Ut-6 0.542*** 
(0.117) 
Ut-9 0.491*** 
(0.110) 
Ut-12 0.508*** 
(0.105) 
USt 0.653*** 
(0.125) 
Constant -14.473*** -15.239*** -12.192*** -12.068*** -13.460*** -13.789*** -13.843*** -12.920*** -12.491*** -12.746*** -12.284*** 
(0.696) (0.836) (1.469) (1.462) (1.397) (1.416) (1.394) (1.470) (1.508) (1.531) (1.459) 
Observations 159 158 158 159 158 157 156 153 150 147 159 
R-squared 0.729 0.734 0.786 0.784 0.806 0.809 0.812 0.797 0.798 0.802 0.786 
Log likelihood -21.55 -20.45 -3.285 -3.673 4.364 5.144 6.058 -1.427 -1.264 -0.765 -2.745 
F 209.9 141.6 111.6 139.5 158.6 160.5 163.1 145.3 142.9 143.7 141.5 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4. DETERMINANTS OF EXITS  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Ut 0.350*** 0.377*** -0.072 -0.245 
(0.120) (0.117) (0.217) (0.235) 
Bt 0.512** 0.282 -0.062 -0.072 0.028 0.046 0.171 0.424 0.532 0.883** -0.043 
(0.207) (0.196) (0.385) (0.426) (0.387) (0.379) (0.368) (0.368) (0.380) (0.379) (0.427) 
Rt 0.212 0.241 
(0.161) (0.166) 
Π
 2006 -0.125 -0.097 -0.066 -0.030 0.005 0.030 0.013 -0.039 -0.096 
(0.144) (0.153) (0.138) (0.133) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) (0.130) (0.153) 
Π
 2008 0.572** 0.753*** 0.454** 0.303 0.099 -0.041 0.029 0.061 0.728*** 
(0.223) (0.246) (0.226) (0.225) (0.213) (0.194) (0.175) (0.155) (0.247) 
Ut-1 0.106 
(0.216) 
Ut-2  0.281 
(0.215) 
Ut-3  0.520** 
(0.205) 
Ut-6  0.712*** 
(0.190) 
Ut-9  0.685*** 
(0.178) 
Ut-12  0.696*** 
(0.165) 
USt  -0.220 
(0.241) 
Constant -9.027*** -7.330*** -4.263* -4.288 -5.629** -6.118** -7.376*** -9.304*** -9.889*** -12.005*** -4.515 
(1.230) (1.324) (2.538) (2.805) (2.549) (2.508) (2.422) (2.388) (2.443) (2.408) (2.819) 
Observations 159 158 158 159 158 157 156 153 150 147 159 
R-squared 0.095 0.133 0.171 0.148 0.161 0.175 0.203 0.242 0.251 0.282 0.146 
Log likelihood -112.1 -93.16 -89.64 -107.3 -90.61 -84.62 -80.10 -75.64 -73.56 -67.40 -107.5 
F 8.206 7.890 6.269 6.677 7.326 8.056 9.613 11.83 12.12 13.94 6.603 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF THE PROGRAM’S RESTRICTIVENESS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ut 0.277*** 0.196* 
(0.054) (0.105) 
Bt 0.378*** -0.147 -0.140 -0.070 -0.052 0.196 0.407** 0.438** -0.119 
(0.094) (0.189) (0.189) (0.190) (0.189) (0.184) (0.183) (0.190) (0.188) 
Π
 2006 0.258*** 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.259*** 0.262*** 0.237*** 0.232*** 0.253*** 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.063) (0.065) (0.068) 
Π
 2008 0.008 0.001 -0.035 -0.014 -0.148 -0.161* -0.106 -0.018 
(0.110) (0.111) (0.113) (0.109) (0.097) (0.084) (0.078) (0.110) 
Ut-1 0.201* 
(0.106) 
Ut-2 0.237** 
(0.108) 
Ut-3 0.215** 
(0.105) 
Ut-6 0.380*** 
(0.095) 
Ut-9 0.423*** 
(0.085) 
Ut-12 0.388*** 
(0.082) 
USt 0.230** 
(0.107) 
Constant -4.652*** -1.437 -1.492 -1.983 -2.040 -3.873*** -5.223*** -5.335*** -1.675 
(0.552) (1.241) (1.247) (1.257) (1.239) (1.196) (1.174) (1.202) (1.241) 
Observations 159 159 159 158 157 154 151 148 159 
R-squared 0.241 0.307 0.308 0.318 0.321 0.379 0.430 0.431 0.312 
Log likelihood 14.95 22.23 22.32 23.58 24.17 29.95 35.98 34.16 22.79 
F 24.71 17.06 17.12 17.82 17.97 22.75 27.54 27.12 17.45 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6. ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
Model  1 Model  2 Model 3 Model  4 
Ct-1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ut-1 -0.770 *** -0.794 *** -0.751 *** -0.810 *** 
(0.093) (0.090) (0.073) (0.077) 
Trend -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 3.604 3.668 3.565 3.713 
Error Correction: DCt DUt DCt DUt DCt DUt DCt DUt 
CointEq1 -0.079 *** -0.032 -0.075 *** -0.029 -0.079 *** -0.073 *** -0.069 *** -0.053 
(0.015) (0.037) (0.013) (0.032) (0.012) (0.029) (0.009) (0.022) 
DCt-1 -0.207 *** -0.084 -0.210 *** -0.077 -0.192 *** -0.138 -0.189 *** -0.144 
(0.078) (0.189) (0.077) (0.186) (0.076 (0.188) (0.074) (0.187) 
DCt-2 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.027 0.023 -0.044 
(0.080) (0.192) (0.078) (0.190) (0.076) (0.189) 
DCt-3 0.057 -0.051 0.052 -0.051 
(0.079) (0.191) (0.077) (0.185) 
DCt-4 0.023 0.072 
(0.077) (0.187) 
DUt-1 -0.062 ** -0.035 -0.065 ** -0.041 -0.068 ** -0.104 -0.059 ** -0.079 
(0.038) (0.091) (0.037) (0.089) (0.036) (0.089) (0.034) (0.086) 
DUt-2 -0.050 -0.044 -0.047 -0.038 -0.049 -0.098 
(0.038) (0.091) (0.036) (0.088) (0.035) (0.087) 
DUt-3 -0.012 0.283 -0.010 0.286 
(0.037) (0.090) (0.036) (0.086) 
DUt-4 -0.016 -0.029 
(0.037) (0.090) 
Constant 0.007 *** 0.002 0.007 *** 0.002 0.007 *** 0.003 0.007 *** 0.002 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
N 155 156 157 158 
R2 0.265 0.060 0.275 0.071 0.277 0.016 0.278 0.017 
Sum sq. resids 0.071 0.413 0.071 0.415 0.072 0.445 0.073 0.459 
S.E. equation 0.022 0.053 0.022 0.053 0.022 0.054 0.022 0.055 
F-statistic 7.175 2.099 9.401 2.688 12.924 1.500 21.144 1.899 
Log likelihood 376.2 239.4 379.1 241.2 381.1 237.8 382.9 237.2 
Akaike AIC -4.725 -2.960 -4.757 -2.990 -4.778 -2.951 -4.796 -2.952 
Schwarz SC -4.529 -2.764 -4.601 -2.834 -4.661 -2.835 -4.719 -2.874 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE  7. ALTERNATIVE ERROR CORRECTION MODELS 
 Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  
Ct-1 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
Ut-1 -0.951***  -1.051***  -1.060***  -0.449***  
 (0.095) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.174) 
 
Trend -0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
 (0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
Constant 4.109 
 
4.356 
 
4.373 
 
2.584 
 
Error Correction: DCt DUt DCt DUt DCt DUt DCt DUt 
CointEq1 -0.062*** -0.035** -0.058*** -0.004 -0.061*** 0.007 -0.064*** -0.064** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.021) (0.009) (0.022) (0.016) (0.041) 
DCt-1 -0.219*** -0.129 -0.228*** -0.115 -0.234*** -0.097 -0.249*** -0.096 
 (0.074) (0.191) (0.075) (0.191) (0.075) (0.190) (0.075) (0.192) 
DUt-1 -0.062** -0.061 -0.058** -0.056 -0.055** -0.065 -0.031 -0.112 
 (0.034) (0.086) (0.033) (0.085) (0.033) (0.085) (0.033) (0.085) 
Rt -0.017*** 0.007 -0.018*** 0.004 -0.014** -0.008 -0.007 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.020) (0.009) (0.022) 
Bt   -0.003 0.062** 0.015 0.013 0.042*** 0.028 
  
 
(0.012) (0.032) (0.017) (0.042) (0.017) (0.042) 
Π
 2006     -0.011 0.032 -0.016*** 0.025 
  
   
(0.007) (0.018) (0.007) (0.019) 
Π
 2008       0.044*** -0.005 
  
     
(0.006) (0.017) 
Constant -0.022** 0.014 -0.009 -0.360** -0.105 -0.101 -0.260*** -0.164 
 (0.013) (0.034) (0.077) (0.196) (0.096) (0.244) (0.095) (0.243) 
N 155 
 
156 
 
157 
 
158 
 
R2 0.298 0.005  0.319  0.048  0.329  0.067 0.351 0.084 
Sum sq. Resids 0.070 0.462  0.0695  0.453  0.068  0.4441 0.066 0.437 
S.E. equation 0.021 0.055  0.021  0.054  0.021  0.054 0.021 0.054 
F-statistic 17.6 1.19  14.261  1.555  12.377  1.823 11.590 1.953 
Log likelihood 385.6 236.7  386.054  238.259 387.264  
239.843 
389.820 241.210 
Akaike AIC -4.818 -2.933 -4.811 -2.939 -4.813 -2.947 -4.833 -2.952 
Schwarz SC -4.721 -2.836 -4.694 -2.823 -4.677 -2.811 -4.678 -2.796 
 
 
